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RECONFIGURING STATE-ACCUSED RELATIONS
IN IRELAND *
SHANE KILCOMMINS AND BARRY VAUGHAN
INTRODUCTION
Ireland's colonial heritage ensured that, until 1922, it broadly followed a
similar trajectory to the penal welfare programmes of action that emerged
in the US and the UK in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. I
The organising principles of this penal welfarism included a commitment to
social engineering and "perfectability of man" discourse; greater knowledge
regulation about individual offenders; and, a shift away from the "calibrated
hierarchical structure" of the nineteenth century, in which La Science
Penitentaire was the dominant penological discourse, to an "extended grid
of non-equivalent and diverse" penal disposals.? After 1922, however, the
momentum generated began to falter. In particular, the infrastructure which
underpinned the "Great Society" and "Welfare State" redistributive projects
in the 1950s and 1960s in the US and UK respectively did not materialise
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ours alone.
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in post-Second World War Ireland. Indeed many of the referents of these
projects, particularly as they related to crime, were notably absent in Ireland:
little official commitment existed to tackle issues of inequality or deviancy;
welfare services in relation to housing, education and health care were
meagre; correctionalist criminology was an "absentee" discipline; and there
was a dearth of expertise. 3
Ironically, this undeveloped state of affairs, coupled with a high degree
of inertia, has, to some extent, buffeted Ireland from the worst excesses
of the "crime complex" currently in evidence in countries such as the US
and UK.4 Modernist traits remain steadfastly apparent and the nihilism
of "nothing works" has never gained a stranglehold. Rehabilitation as a
rationale, for example, remains on the agenda at some level'; the judiciary
remain committed to "individuated" sentencing practices"; discussions on
crime remain focused, to some extent, on "deprivation rather than depravity"?
as many agencies concerned with crime continue to recognise the "multiple
disadvantages" experienced by offenders"; the liberal ideology of legalism
and constitutionalism is still a formidable epistemic and practical force; and
the probation service has not yet jettisoned its social work ethos in favour
of a more coercive form of care that is premised on risk management and
public protection."
At the same time, however, and although it is true that modernist
assumptions continue to be upheld and 'pursued, traces of a more punitive
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"logics of action"-embracing many of Garland's crime control indices-are
also increasingly evident in Ireland. Suchphenomena include the politicisation
of law and order, IQ increases in maximum sentences, prison expansionism, 11
the curtailment of judicial discretion in certain circumstances, the legislative
control of groups of offenders, 12 and the increased dissociation of the offender
from the state and society. Many of these newer orthodoxies currently jockey
for position with more embedded modernist routines, commitments and
priorities. The extent to which all ofthese practices are constitutive of a new
penal order, or remain surface events which will eventually be subsumed
under a relatively loose modernist structure, is beyond the scope of this article.
For what it's worth, we believe it is too early to talk of sharp discontinuities
between due process/penal welfarist and culture of control models of justice.
The embedded nature of many of the characteristics of penal modernity,
the newness of the emerging orthodoxies, and the lack of an administrative
structure which could ensure their potency in having an immediate impact
all militate against the possibility of a sudden irruptive point in the trajectory
of Irish criminal justice. Any broad reconfiguration is likely to be of the
staccato kind, involving relatively rapid reversals of some aspects of penal
modernity, whilst encountering dogged resistance on others.
The purpose of this article is to focus, rather narrowly, on one of the
locations where the Irish penal landscape appears to be capable of being
renegotiated relatively quickly-the policymaking approach adopted in
respect of those suspected of criminal activity. Itwill be argued that this key
constituent in the organising pattern of the Irish penal complex is currently a
contested site, with the logic and normative legitimacy of due process values
and assumptions increasingly under threat. In this article, we will document
how the delicate equilibrium between freedom from government and public
protection is being unsettled by an anxious State determined to show strength
by "tooling up" in the fight against crime. This will be examined by focusing
on three related backdrops: the normalization of "extraordinary laws", the
hollowing out of due process values more generally, and the increasing
adoption of punitive civil sanctions. Though this challenge to the hegemonic
dominance of the modern model of justice is only been examined through
a single frame and therefore cannot be taken to represent the entire penal
field, it does, it will be argued, constitute evidence of a newer strain of
control as regards those accused of crime that will prove difficult to unsettle
or reverse.
10. 1.O'Donnell, and E. O'Sullivan, "The Politics ofIntolerance - Irish Style" (2003)
43(1) Brit. J. Criminol. 43(1) 41-62.
11. S. Kilcommins, Crime Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland (Dublin:
Institute of Public Administration, 2004), pp.232-81.
12. The Sex Offenders Act 2001 exemplifies the priority currently given to the control
of groups of offenders. See also Enright v Ireland and the Attorney General [2003]
21.R.321.
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THE "NORMALISATION" OF EXTRAORDINARY LAW
Following the War ofIndependence (1919-21) which broke the stranglehold
of colonial rule, and the Civil War (1922-23) which was fought on the
basis of the Treaty drawn up between British and Irish representatives in
December 1921, a law-bound democratic polity began to emerge in Ireland.
This nascent polity was scaffolded and buttressed by majority affirmation of
the Irish Free State Constitution of 1922. Most of those who had engaged
in both wars crossed the Rubicon from militarism to constitutional politics.
Democracy itself, however, continued to be threatened and blighted in the
ensuing two decades by a residual militant republicanism that manifested
itself in the form of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In order to obtain
an all-Ireland Republic that would encompass the six counties which were
partitioned as a result of the Treaty settlement, the IRA sought to transfer the
powers of the Irish state's democratic institutions to its Army Council. The
fledgling Irish state responded with a series of draconian emergency laws
and tactics that enjoyed a "high degree of public tolerance". 13 These included
the introduction of military tribunals with the power to dispense justice
for capital crimes, restrictions on the right to appeal the decisions of such
tribunals, internment powers without trial, intrusive political surveillance,
the proscription of certain organisations, the power to proclaim meetings
and increased powers of search and seizure."
A new Constitution came into force in following its approval by
a referendum in July 1937. As compared with its 1922 predecessor, it
provided for a much more entrenched system of judicial review, redefined
the range of habeas corpus safeguards, and gave greater protection to a
range of personal rights. Nonetheless, the history of parami1itarism in
Ireland ensured that provision was also made for the security menace still
posed to the state. The establishment of special non-jury courts (under
Art.38.3), whose powers, composition, jurisdiction, and procedures were
to be established by legislation, and provisions in respect of treason (under
Art.39) all signpost the contingencies that were still being made to protect
state security from subversive activity. More broadly, Art.28.3.3° also gave
constitutional immunity to any law which was "expressed to be for the
preservation of public safety of the state in time of war or armed rebellion."
Once a declaration of emergency was made by both Houses of the Oireachtas,
constitutional rights and safeguards could be abridged. Two such resolutions
declaring states of emergency have been made --once in 1939 until 1946
(though it was not formally rescinded until 1976), and then again in 1976.
The latter resolution was only formally rescinded in February 1995 following
the IRA ceasefire.
More permanently, and following renewed IRA activity in the late-
13. E. O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), p.20 1.
14. G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 175-77.
94 Shane Kilcommins and Barry Vaughan
1930s in Ireland and Britain, the Offences Against the State Act 1939 (the
"1939 Act") was introduced. The 1939Act and its subsequent amendments,
particularly in 1972 and 1998, are open to constitutional challenge. The 1939
Act forms the principal pillar in Ireland's permanent quest to protect state
security. The first four parts of theAct are permanently in force. For example,
Pt II deals, inter alia, with offences against the state such as the usurpation
of the functions of government, obstruction of government, obstruction
of the President, unauthorised military exercises and the possession of
treasonable and seditious documents. Part III contends with membership
of unlawful organisations. On the other hand, Pt V,which makes provision
for the establishment of the Special Criminal Court and the power of the
government to schedule offences, only comes into operation when the
government makes the appropriate proclamation that the ordinary courts'
are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the
preservation of public peace and order. In making such proclamations under
Pt V,the government does not have to explain to the Dail why such draconian
measures are deemed necessary. The necessary proclamations under Pt V of
the 1939 Act have been made for the periods 1939-46, 1961-62 and 1972
to date. The current proclamation can be annulled only by a resolution of
the Dail or when the government issues a proclamation declaring that Pt V
is no longer in force. IS '
The enactment of the 1939 Act must be seen in a context in which it
was thought that democracy in Ireland was extremely fragile and in need of
extraordinary powers to sustain it against the "enemy within" who sought
to subvert the state. This meant that Ireland placed a degree of reliance
on extra-ordinary legislation to counter the specific threat posed. What is
striking about this "extraordinary" legislation, however, is that it has proved
remarkably malleable in adjusting to more normal circumstances. Despite
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which is dependent on
the maintenance of paramilitary ceasefires and decommissioning, and which
"looks forward to a normalisation of security arrangements and practices,"
the Irish government has demonstrated no willingness to remove the such
extraordinary laws. In times of penal crisis, the result-orientated potential of
these extra-ordinary provisions quickly looked attractive to the authorities.
Indeed they have come to be seen as an efficient means of investigating
and prosecuting serious, though ordinary, crimes." This has occurred in a
variety of fields.
Evidence of this normalisation process is discernible in the wide use of
the extraordinary powers of arrest and detention-so as to encompass some
15. See S. Kilcommins and B. Vaughan, "A Perpetual Sense of Emergency: Subverting
the Rule of Law in Ireland" (2004) 35 Cambrian L.R. 55.
16. See S. Kilcommins and B. Vaughan, "A Perpetual Sense of Emergency: Subverting
the Rule of Law in Ireland" (2004) 35 Cambrian L.R. 55. See also P. Hillyard, "The
Normalisation of Special Powers: From Northern Ireland to Britain" in P. Scraton,
(ed.), Law, Order and the Authoritarian State (Milton Keynes: Open University,
1987, pp.279- 312.
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serious, though non-paramilitary activities-permitted under s.30 of the
1939 Act. 17 Further evidence of this normalisation process can be gleaned
from the continued retention of the non-jury Special Criminal Court. The
re-introduction of the Court in 1972, at the height of "the Troubles" in
Northern Ireland," was justified on the basis that juries were likely to be
intimidated by paramilitaries. It continues to be employed today despite little
in the way of a risk assessment as to whether or not there was a possibility
of continued paramilitary intimidation.'? Moreover, the Special Criminal
Court is increasingly being employed to try cases that have no paramilitary
connections. Offences without subversive connections which have been
tried in the Special Criminal Court include the supply of cannabis, arson at
a public house, theft of computer parts, kidnapping, the murder of Veronica
Guerin, receiving a stolen caravan and its contents, the unlawful taking of a
motor car and the theft of cigarettes and £150 from a shop." Significantly,
the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions to have a case tried in the
Special Criminal Court is not susceptible to judicial review in the absence
of evidence of mala fides or of being influenced by an improper motive or
an improper policy. Even despite its breach of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the fact that it was established under an anti-
terrorist framework that is no longer applicable," the arrangement continues
to be justified on the basis of its usefulness to the State in combating organised
crime-a form of crime that has, without much debate, assumed the "folk
devil" security-threatening status previously only associated in Ireland with
political violence." Indeed, far from being disbanded on the basis of the
17. See DPP v Quilligan [1986] IR 495. See also D. Walsh, "The Impact of Anti
Subversive Laws on Police Powers and Practice in Ireland: the Silent Erosion
of Individual Freedom" (1989) 62(4) Temp L. Rev. 1099-1102; G. Hogan and
C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1989).
18. This was how the Irish government justified its introduction to the European
Commission of Human Rights in Eccles, McPhillips and McShane v Ireland
(Application No. 12839/87, Decision of December 9, 1988).
19. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties suggests that the "level of paramilitary violence
has declined more than tenfold since the mid 1970s and the threat of paramilitary
violence now comes largely from very small splinter groups with virtually no
popular support." Irish Council of Civil Liberties Submission to the Committee to
Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-98, and related matters available
at: http://www.icc/.ie/criminalj/emergency/99 _submission.oasa.html
20. Available at: http://www.iccl.ie/criminalj/emergency/99 _submission.oasa.html
21. See Kavanagh v Ireland, Human Rights Committee of the United Nations April
4,2001, (CCPRlC7D/819/1998). See, for example, the Report of the UN Human
Rights Committee in 1993 which suggested that "it did not consider that the
continued existence of that court is justified in the present circumstances." Report
of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, 48th
Session, Supplement No. 40, 1993,(A/48/40), Part 1, pp. 125-28.
22. C. Fennell, The Law a/Evidence in Ireland, 2nd edn, (Dublin: Butterworths, 2003),
p.23; "Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939
to 1998, and related matters." (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2001), para.937.
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notable downturn in paramilitary activity, the Irish government has recently
announced that a second such court will be established to expedite trials.
The establishment of this second court will, according to a government
press release, "serve to demonstrate the State's resolve to seriously deal
with any activity which is a threat to the State and its people"." The once
emboldening claim that one has a right to a jury trial in Ireland, as provided
for under Art.38.S of the Constitution of 1937, seems much more fragile, and
somewhat quixotic, in the light of such developments. In the Irish Supreme
Court in the early 1980s, for example, Henchy J. stated:
"I am satisfied that the indissoluble attachment to trial by jury ... was
one of the prime reasons why the Constitution of 1937 (like that of
1922) mandated trial with a jury as the normal mode of trying major
offences. The bitter Irish race-memory of politically appointed and
Executive-oriented judges, of the suspension of jury trial in times of
popular revolt, of the substitution ... of summary trial or detention
without trial, of cat-and-mouse releases from such detention, of
packed juries and sometimes corrupt judges and prosecutors, had long
implanted in the consciousness of the people and, therefore, in the
minds of their political representatives, the conviction that the best
way of preventing an individual from suffering a-wrong conviction for
an offence was to allow him to "put himself upon his country," that
is to say, to allow him to be tried for that offence by a fair, impartial
and representative jury, sitting in a court presided over by an impartial
and independent judge appointed under the Constitution, who would
see that all the requirements for a fair and proper jury trial would be
observed, so that, amongst other things, if the jury's verdict were one
of not guilty, the accused could leave court with the absolute assurance
that he would never again "be vexed" for the same charge.'?"
Such reasoning now stands in dissonant isolation from the increasingly more
result-orientated logic being adopted in the Irish penal complex.
The introduction of a witness protection programme-set up following
the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin-to assist the Gardai in the fight
against organised crime also provides further evidence that the Irish criminal
justice system no longer irradiates with due process concerns. The type of
witnesses protected by the programme are not simply run-of-the-mill self-
confessed accomplices, but fall into a definitional category more in keeping
with "supergrass" testimony, a term made infamous following a series of
paramilitary trials in the Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland in the 1980s.25
The damning information which such witnesses have provided has been
utilised by the State to apprehend and prosecute a series of high profile
23. Available at wwwjustice.ie/80256EOI003A02CF/vWeb/pcJUSQ67WJPH-en.
24. People (DPP) v O'Shea [1982] LR. 384, at 432.
25. See S. Greer, "Supergrasses in the Legal System in Britain and Ireland" (1986) 102
L.Q.R. 198-249.
Reconfiguring State-Accused Relations in Ireland 97
individuals operating in the world of organised crime. In return for such
information, the witnesses, who themselves had also repeatedly partaken
in criminal activities, were given the opportunity of an improved lifestyle.
Aside from the possibility of jeopardising the entire criminal procedure
process by admitting evidence which is highly susceptible to fabrication
and exaggeration, and which is often incapable of being properly verified,
the practice of utilising such witnesses has also increased the likelihood of
Garda corruption, particularly in relation to information gathering. Current
ambivalence about such testimony and the "fluidity" in the operation of the
programme is even more surprising when one considers that only 20 years ago
Irish politicians and the general public condemned with gusto the adoption
of similar "extraordinary" "supergrass" practices inNorthern Ireland." In the
space of two decades, however, arguments about the right to a fair trial, the
protection of the innocent, transparent management and basic human rights
have been displaced in part by the need for a more efficient "truth seeking"
criminal justice system.
Indeed, without much thought or assessment, those involved in serious
crime currently in Ireland have quickly been elevated to the status of a
security threat equivalent to that of the paramilitaries in the not too distant
past. The intense outrage produced by such crimes, coupled with demands
for the State to reassert its power through the criminal justice system, has
resulted in a "national emergency" that demands that ever clearer lines be
drawn between a fearful public and "monstrous" criminals. Increasingly, the
state has been tempted to turn to its long history of extraordinary provisions to
combat the threat posed by ordinary, "folk devil" criminals. Inmany respects,
the benchmark provided by these extraordinary provisions has facilitated the
fast-tracking of a crime control model of justice as it relates to issues such as
an emphasis on efficiency, security, public protection and the devaluation of
accuseds' rights. This benchmarking obscures the trade-off that takes place
between enhanced public protection, on the one hand, and the commitment
to due process values on the other. More importantly, it also takes place in
an empirical vacuum about the actual threats posed by certain "folk devils",
the suitability of extraordinary provisions in the circumstances, or the impact
on due process values in general.
For example, and has been noted elsewhere," a glance at the Irish
parliamentary reports over the years demonstrates the "metaphoric pathways"
being created between terrorism and ordinary crime.
• "[D]rugs have replaced terrorism as the number one threat to the
security of the State.''"
• "Just as President Clinton proclaimed in his visit to Belfast
26. S. Kilcommins and B. Vaughan, "A Perpetual Sense of Emergency: Subverting the
Rule of Law in Ireland" (2004) 35 Cambrian L.R. 55, at 68-71.
27. S. Kilcommins and B. Vaughan, "A Perpetual Sense of Emergency: Subverting the
Rule of Law in Ireland" (2004) 35 Cambrian L.R. 55, at 74-75.
28. Dail Debates, vol.641 co1.284, February 6, 1996, per Mr Haughey.
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that the children of this generation in Northern Ireland have a'
right to be born and raised in an environment free from terrorist
violence, so too do the children of this generation throughout
Ireland have the right to be born and raised in an environment
free from criminal violence and abuse.?"
• "Whether we like it or not there is a state of emergency. It is
no use saying otherwise. This has happened because ... [civil
libertarians] ... who are always trotted out whenever there
is a situation like that created by the dreadful murder of the
journalist, Veronica Guerin, have been saying for a long time
that criminals are entitled to their civil rights. These murderers
and criminals do not recognise other people's civil rights. Why
should we recognise theirs? We should open up the Curragh [a
former military camp] and intern them. People who are caught
selling drugs, purchasing drugs, or selling them to get their own
free deals should be taken out of circulation.l'"
• " ... I mentioned the threat the IRA posed, and continues to pose,
to this State. I have also begun to wonder whether there is the
same realisation of the threat posed to our society by the criminal
underworld .... I was informed of a community meeting held
in Dublin recently at which the drugs problem was discussed,
when there was a discreet Special Branch presence outside the
building endeavouring to ascertain whether there was any IRA
presence. . .. I wonder whether all criminals nationwide are
watched as closely. We must encourage rather than discourage
such surveillance.?"
• "Following a gangland killing in December 2006, politicans
claimed that the 'country was in a virtual state of national
emergency'; and calls were made for the Gardai and the Army
to come together to round up the drug barons and murderers who
it was claimed were 'reducing Dublin to a bloodbath' ."32
• "In proposing draconian new powers designed to combat
organized crime in February 2007, the Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform, Michael Mcfrowell, said he believed
that the measures represented a proportionate response to the
criminal underworld, which posed 'the greatest threat to our
democracy since the advent of paramilitarism in the 1970s'."33
Ireland has a long history of relying on emergency powers to combat the
threat posed by paramilitarism on the island. This tradition of invoking
extra-ordinary laws and creating special zones where normal laws do not
29. Seanad Debates, vol.l46 co1.88, January 31, 1996, per Mr O'Kennedy
30. Dail Debates, vo1.488 cols.554-55, July 4, 1996.
31 Dail Debates, vol.468 co1.373, July 3, 1996.
32. Irish Times, December 13,2006.
33. Irish Times, February 14,2007.
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apply has facilitated the rapid advance of a crime control model of justice.
The normalisation of these special zones has been achieved through, inter
alia, a criminology of the "extra-ordinary" which seeks to accentuate the
public security parallels that supposedly exist between paramilitaries and
particular groupings of ordinary "folk-devil" criminals. Such metaphorical
and dramaturgical parallels can by and large be defined by a paucity of
supporting details. This absence of convincing evidence to support the
parallels being drawn, or the justifications being purchased, has not however,
and as we will see, curtailed efforts to dismantle the "equality of arms" values
that traditionally existed between the state and those accused of crime. Indeed
the reconfiguration has occurred in an environment where the public has
become habituated to the employment of a crime control model of justice
for paramilitaries and amenable-however fragile the evidence-to a similar
instrurnentallogic of repression on the grounds of security being employed
in the ordinary sphere.
The upshot is that Ireland has permitted a partial post-constitutional coma
to occur in which it is unclear whether the Law is King or the King is Law.
Such phenomena calls to mind the work of Carl Schmitt--one of the chief
academic supporters of executive absolutism in Nazi Germany-and his
infamous statement: "sovereign is he who decides upon the exception"." He
suggested that normal legal orders were entirely ineffective in combating dire
crises. The technical complexities upon which they are premised--created
through liberal constitutionalism-paralyses their capacity to make effective
and vital "friend/foe" distinctions. But Schmitt suggests that throughout
history states developed techniques that ignored standing constitutions
and the strictures of formalized legal orders in times of emergencies.
Liberal constitutionalism, according to him, has always largely neglected
the functional necessity of such a phenomenon. In order to counteract
extraordinary conditions, e.g. invasion, insurrection, plague or famine, states
often in the past introduced emergency provisions that operated outside
the parameters of normal legal relations. For Schmitt, these exceptional
emergency provisions could be divided into two categories --commissarial or
sovereign. The commissarial model was premised on a functional rationality
that only permitted reliance on emergency measures when it was absolutely
expedient to do so. The sole purpose of such measures was to facilitate the
re-imposition of the normal legal order. Once the specified crisis was averted,
the emergency provisions were deemed superfluous and the status quo ante
was restored. Procedural rules were in place which ensured a strict separation
between the institution declaring the emergency and the one employing the
extraordinary and exceptional powers under such conditions. Moreover, the
operation of such powers was tightly circumscribed in terms of their duration
and the objectives to be achieved. This approach to extraordinary powers
champions the rule oflaw and constitutional order. Derogations in the form
34. C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Theory of Sovereignty
(Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1986), p.5.
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of extraordinary measures are strictly limited so as to maintain order, as far
as practicable, within a rule oflaw/constitutional order framework."
The historical gold standard as regards emergency power that fell under a,
commissarial rubric is the classical Roman institution of dictatorship. In times
of severe crisis, the Roman Senate would declare an emergency. Consuls
were then requested by the Senate to appoint a dictator. Almost unlimited
power was granted to the dictator to eliminate the emergency. However, in
exercising such power, the dictator was strictly bound by a priori time- and
task-related limits, and the imperative to restore the regular legal order. A
dictatorship, accordingly, that did not have the purpose of making itself
superfluous under this model was considered "random despotism"."
The sovereign model on the other hand, the one favoured by Schrnitt,
takes the rule of law and constitutional order to be lifeless, and more
orientated towards discussions rather than decisions. Antithetical to liberal
values and human rights, it seeks to move towards a more absolute form
of sovereignty in which the entire order between the sovereign and the
emergency powers is made more seamless. The focus of this model is on
permitting the State to react without legal restriction by creating a permanent
condition of emergency that is not checked by duration or task. It specifically
endorses the state's continuous right-through unchecked decisionism-to
respond to unforeseen and unexpected occurrences in as efficient a manner
as possible, free from the hindrance of excessive legal prescription. In such
a political environment, the institutional distinctions between the decision
to declare an emergency and the exercise of that power are collapsed."
Though Ireland falls a long way short of the entirely post-constitutional
order as depicted by Schmitt under this model, the continued maintenance
of broad extraordinary decision making powers that lift the subject out of
the ordinary legally constituted order, as detailed above, and the lack of
safeguards as regards their existence and employment, has meant, in part,
that a conflation has occurred between the normal and extraordinary legal
orders. The blind continuance of the Special Criminal Court, for example,
calls into question the extent to which its presence is designed to preserve
the constitutional order-by combating the specified threat and facilitating
the restoration of the status quo ante--or to usurp it through abrogating the
right to a jury trial.
35. See D. Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and
Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp.38-98; I.P.
McCorrnick, The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency
Powers (1997) 10 C.J.L.I. 167-88.
36. C. Schrnitt, Die Diktatur (Munich & Leipzig: Duncker &Humbolt, 1921), p.xvi, as
quoted in I. P. McCorrnick, Carl Schmitt s Critique of Liberalism: against politics
as technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
37. See B. Scheureman, The Rule of Law under Siege: Carl Schmitt and the death
of the Weimar Republic (1993) 14(2) History of Political Thought 265-280; I.P.
McCorrnick Carl Schmitt 's Critique of Liberalism: against politics as technology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.121-56.
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Moreover, and though many of us may find Schmitt's naked endorsement
of authoritarianism objectionable, his work can help us engage more with the
mechanisms by which emergency or extraordinary situations are identified
in Ireland, the separation that exists between the initiation of such powers
and their exercise, the purpose of such powers (are they currently being
employed to preserve or suspend the Constitution?), the checks on their
operation, and the manner in which such powers are relinquished. It can also
act as a stepping stone thorough which we can become more aware of the
fragility of the Rule a/Law (and the constitutional state) and how it can be
distinguished from Rule by Law (and the security state), where the former
is taken to mean "the constraints which normative conceptions of the rule of
law place on the instrumental use of law" while the latter means "the use of
law as a brute instrument to achieve the ends of those with political power"."
Many of the extraordinary measures employed in Ireland demonstrate Rule
by Law tendencies. As Dyzenhaus notes:
"[The Rule of] Law ... is not an autonomous constraint on actions
but a constraint which those with political power will accept or not
depending on their relative strength. If accepting the constraint is
the only way elites can maintain the power they will, otherwise not.
Not only is the choice to abide by the rule oflaw a matter of political
incentives, the same is true of the choice to use rule by law to achieve
one's ends. It follows that the weaker one's relative position, the
closer one will find oneself to the normative, rule of law end of the
continuum that stretches between rule by law and rule of law. One
who is in a very powerful position will submit to ruling at various
points away from the rule by law end of that continuum only when
it is expedient to do SO."39
SECURING JUSTICE UNDER THE NORMAL LEGAL ORDER
As noted above, the ability of the Irish state to invoke extra-ordinary laws
and create special zones where normal laws do not apply has facilitated, in
part, the advance of a crime control model of justice. At the same time the
"normal" laws themselves, which increasingly only apply to low risk groups
of offenders and suspects, are often unconditionally championed as evidence
of our unceasing commitment to civil liberties, human rights and due process
concerns." But even these civil liberties, as we shall see in this section, are
38. See D. Dyzenhaus (2006) "States of Exception" at p.1 0, available at: http://ptw.
uchicago. edu/DyzenhausO l.pdf.
39. D. Dyzenhaus (2006) "States of Exception", at p. 11.
40. For example, in April 2003, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
Michael McDowell, could suggest that Ireland was the only "member state of
the ED in which individual citizens are guaranteed the constitutional right to due
process, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, to trial by jury in all non minor
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not safe from reconfigurations which subtly tip, in accordance with dictates
of efficiency, the State-accused balance more in favour of the former.
To begin with, recent changes in the law of search and seizure bear;
testimony to the current prioritization being given to "tooling up" the State
and the concomitant hydraulic decline in the value placed on the primacy
of the individual and limiting official power. The un-cuffing of the Gardai
in this regard is evident, for example, in the number of statutes which now
permit search warrants to be issued internally by senior Garda officers
in "circumstances of urgency". This more self-substantiating process
circumvents the need for judges or peace commissioners to be independently
satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for the crossing of thresholds." It is
also evident in the enactment of the so-called "hot pursuit" provision which
enables Gardai to enter onto private property without a warrant when they
are pursuing a suspected offender, diluting somewhat the sanctity of the
inviolability of the dwelling as provided for inArt.40.5 of the Constitution";
the authorization of very broad garda powers to seize any material in the
circumstances of effecting a search"; and the introduction of far-reaching
powers under the Criminal Justice Act 1994 in relation to drug trafficking
and money laundering that provide for the issuance of access orders and
search warrants against innocent third parties, such as solicitors and financial
advisors, who may possess materials and documents that relate to suspected
offences." The Gardai are also increasingly beginning to rely on more
sophisticated methods of investigation that encroach upon the privacy rights
of individuals and the sanctity of previously privileged relationships. These
cases, to fair bail, to the presumption of innocence, to habeas corpus, and the right
to have any law invalidated in the courts which conflicts with his or her rights and
the right not to have any ofthese rights altered except by referendum". Irish Times,
April 24, 2003.
41. See s.14 of Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, s.8 of the Criminal Justice (Drug
Trafficking) Act 1996, and People (DPP) v Byrne (unreported, Court of Criminal
Appeal, October 30, 2003). See also s.5(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 which
empowers a Garda of Superintendent rank or higher to issue a direction designating
a place as a crime scene. This authorizes Gardai to search for and collect evidence at
the crime scene (including a dwelling) and to impose restrictions on persons present
or seeking to gain entry into the crime scene. Under s.5(7), this direction lasts for
24 hours, but can be extended by 48 hours on application to a District Court judge.
Such an extension may be granted on three consecutive occasions under section
5(9).
42. See s.6(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1997.
43. s.9 of the Criminal Law Act 1976; see also s.7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007.
44. See ss.63 and 64 of the Criminal Justice Act 1994. In Hanahoe v Hussey, [1998]
3 IR 69 at 94-96, Kinlen J. in the High Court noted that hitherto search warrants
were only ever issued in respect of proposed respondents to any investigation. He
learned judge went on to note: "we live in an era offantastic and intrusive invasion
of privacy. The State, the media and many electronic devices have combined in
a growing and worrying assertion that the invasion is allowable because of the
battle against crime and corruption and also based on the alleged 'public's right
to know'."
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include the use of "information reporters" such as banks, building societies,
auditors and solicitors who are required to report various unlawful activities
or suspicious transactions of their clients to the State"; the use of mass
surveillance such as CCTV46; and the requirement that telephone companies
and intemet service providers retain data on their customers for the purposes
of assisting the Gardai with their investigations."
The past 25 years has also witnessed dramatic increased powers of
detention for the Gardai. For example, the Criminal Justice Act 1984 made
provision for the first time for the detention of "ordinary suspects" for a
maximum of 12 hours. Prior to this, the purpose of an arrest for an ordinary
crime was to secure the suspect's presence in court. Provision had already
existed in the terrorist domain for detention without charge. Under s.30 of
the 1939Act, a suspect could be detained for a maximum of 48 hours without
charge. The Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1998, introduced
following the Omagh bombing, extended this period of detention by a
further 24 hour period, when necessary. Returning to ordinary crime, under
s.2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 (the "1996 Act"),
an individual may be detained for a cumulative total of 7 days on suspicion
that the person has committed a drug trafficking offence. The Leahy Report
in 1998, drawing heavily on existing terrorist provisions, recommended
extending the standard maximum period of detention (12 hours) to 24 hours,
with provision for a further 24 hour period, if necessary, for certain specified
offences such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping and rape." Section 9 of
the Criminal Justice Act 2006 extends the maximum period of detention for
ordinary, though serious, crime from 12 to 24 hours. There is thus a trend
towards expanding the duration of pre-trial detention in Ireland. "The whole
centre of gravity of the criminal process" as Walsh has noted, "is moving
45. Solicitors, for example, are required to report clients' suspicious transactions to the
Garda Siochana and the Revenue Commissioners under s.6 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1994 (Section 32) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 242 of2003) on the Prevention of
the use of the Financial System for the purpose of Money Laundering. Similarly, s.73
of the Company Law Enforcement Act of2001 provides that whenever disciplinary
tribunals of accountancy bodies have reasonable grounds for believing that an
indictable offence has been committed by one of their members it must report the
suspicion to the Director of Corporate Enforcement.
46. Garda CCTV schemes were first introduced in Dublin in 1995. The Minister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform also launched a Community Based CCTV Scheme
in June 2005. This initiative was designed to facilitate communities to press ahead
with their own local CCTV system. The scheme operates in accordance with s.38
of the Garda Siochana Act 2005.
47. In April 2002, the Minister for Public Enterprise issued the direction under s.11O( I)
of the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act 1983. See also s.63 of the
Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, and art. I 5 of the EU Directive on
Privacy and Electronic Communications (Directive 200/58/EC).
48. "Report of the Expert Group on changes to the Criminal Law" (Dublin: Stationery
Office, 1998). See also D. Keane, "Detention without Charge and the Criminal
Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996" (1997) 7(1) I.C.L.J. 1-17; A. Ryan, "Arrest
and Detention: a review of the law" (2000) 10(1) I.C.L.J. 2-10.
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rapidly away from the open public forum of the court and into the private
closed demesne of the police station.'?" The same author noted:
"[i]ncreasingly guilt will be determined by executive processes in the
closed secrecy of the police station rather than by judicial processes
in the public transparency of the courtroom. Judicial territory is
being ceded to the police to achieve a further streamlining and
bureaucratisation of the criminal process. "50
Unfortunately, this trajectory has never been justified or framed in empirical
terms (when, for example, does the legitimate tactic of interrogation reach
a point of diminishing returns?). Such concerns are amplified by a number
of related issues.
First, the system has increasingly demonstrated a complacent attitude
to the right of a detained suspect to have access to a lawyer. This right of
access is worth further consideration given that it is one of the most basic of
all procedural fairness rights. The legal and constitutional right to reasonable
access to a lawyer is well established in Ireland." Such a prophylactic
requirement however has been narrowly construed so as to mean that a
detained suspect only has a right of access to his or her solicitor for one hour
during every six hours of detention. Moreover, and provided the Gardai have
made bona fide attempts to contact a solicitor, they are entitled to question
the detained suspect. Given that no duty solicitor scheme operates in Ireland,
securing the services of one of a solicitor, particularly at weekends, may be
more difficult than would otherwise be expected. Even if contact is made with
a solicitor, and assuming that he or she is available to come to the station,
there is nothing to prevent the Gardai questioning the detained suspected
in the interim period before the solicitor's arrival. Even when the solicitor
presents him- or herself at the station, he or she is not entitled to sit in on
the interrogation-the right to reasonable access does not extend to have a
solicitor present during the interrogation. Nor is the solicitor entitled to have
an audio/visual recording of the interviews (assuming they are available)
or to see the interview notes during her client's detention. The stark lack of
protection afforded to a detained person regarding access to a solicitor-and
narrow judicial and garda constructions as to what constitutes reasonable
access-raises, as one commentator noted, questions about the commitment
of the institutions of the Irish State "to the protection of basic human rights
49. D. Walsh, "The Criminal Justice Bill: Completing a Crime Control Model of
Justice", The Criminal Justice Bill: implications for Human Rights and Legal
Practice, Trinity College Dublin, April 20, 2005.
50. D. Walsh, "Police Powers in the Criminal Justice Act, 2006: the triumph of executive
convenience over judicial checks and balances", Thomson Round Hall Criminal
Law Conference 2006, Royal College of Surgeons, November 25, 2006, pp.4-5.
51. See, for example, Re Article 26 and the Emergency Powers Bill 1976 [1977] I.R.
159 and People (DPP) v Conroy [1986] I.R. 460. The constitutional right of access
was first established in DPP v Healy [1990] 21.R. 73.
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and to the dignity of its citizens as human persons.?" Increasingly, the
presence of a solicitor in a garda station is seen as an internecine impediment
to the pursuit of the truth rather than as a vital safeguard designed to dispel
the compelling atmosphere inherent in the interrogation.
Secondly, significant inroads have also been made into the pre-trial
right to silence. Sections 18 and 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, for
example, allow adverse inferences to be drawn from an accused's failure
to account for objects, marks, or substances in his or her possession, and
a failure to account for one's presence at a place at or about the time of a
crime was committed, respectively. Similarly, s.7 of the 1996 Act enables
inferences to be drawn from a failure to mention certain facts when questioned
which are later relied upon in defence at trial. All of these inferences have
corroborative value only. 53 The seminal case in Ireland on the right to silence
is Heaney v Ireland= Unlike the High Court which located the right in the
guarantee ofa fair trial under Art.38.1 of the Constitution, the Irish Supreme
Court held that the right to silence is but a corollary to the right to freedom
of expression under ArtAO of the Constitution. If the latter right could be
qualified, so too could the former. Aside from finding a constitutional locus
for the right to silence in a weaker, more "collective" rights domain, thereby
permitting its abrogation on a wider basis, the Supreme Court went on to
note that where a person was, "totally innocent of any wrongdoing ... it
would require a strong attachment to one's apparent constitutional rights not
to give such an account when asked pursuant to statutory requirement.?"
The notion that the right to silence is one in which an accused is guaranteed
the right to remain silent unless he or she chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his or her own will is clearly undermined by the judgment in
Heaney. Increasingly, the perception has emerged-echoing Benthamite and
Posnerian reasoning's=-that the innocent are the only persons for whom the
egregious right could never be useful or advantageous. Along the way, the
52. J.P.M. White, "The Confessional State - Police Interrogation in the Irish
Republic" (2000) 10(1) I.C.L.J. 17-20 at 17. See also DPP v Buck (unreported,
Court of Criminal Appeal, December 6, 1999); Lavery v The Member in Charge,
Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 21.R. 390; N. McFadden, (2002) "The Right
to a Solicitor: Recent Developments" (2002) 7(7) Bar Review 390-392; S. Costelloe
"Detention for Questioning and Oppressive Interrogation" (2001) 11(1) I.C.L.J.
at 12.
53. For similar corroborative inferences in the terrorist realm, see ss.2 and 5 of the
Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998. Section 7 of the Criminal
Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 2006 and s.5 of the Offences Against the State
(Amendment) Act 1998 have been replaced by Pt IV of the Criminal Justice Act
2007 which restricts the right to silence at a more general level.
54. [1994] 3 I.R. 593 (High Court), [1996] I.R. 580 (Supreme Court).
55. [1996] I.R. 580 at 586. See G. Hogan, "Constitutional Law - the right to silence
after National Irish Banks and Finnerty" (1999) 21 D.U.L.J. 176.
56. See A. Lewis (1990) "Bentham's View of the Right to Silence" (1990) 43 C.L.P.
135-157; see also R. Posner, "An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence"
(1999) 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477-1546.
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reified, purer form of the right, and the rationale underpinning it," has been
replaced by the vapid notion that it is the "first refuge of the guilty". 58 This;
is also borne out in a recent submission by the Gardai to a Joint Committee
on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights:
"The present status of the right to silence is an historical relic and
harks back to a previous age when suspects were deemed to be of ,
limited intelligence. It is untenable that in serious crimes such as
murder and rape, theft or fraud, suspects can refuse to disclose their
whereabouts when questioned and courts cannot draw inferences
from this. It is not a question of compelling anyone to speak but
rather informing the court of a refusal and empowering it to draw
inferences and take appropriate note.'?"
Thirdly, there appears to be growing evidence of garda malpractice. Such
evidence includes:
• Threats and inducements by the interviewing Gardai in the Paul
Ward case, an individual who was suspected of the murder of
Veronica Guerin.
• The insertion offalse information by members of the Gardai into
the notes of interviews with Colm Murphy, a person suspected
of having been involved in the Omagh bombing in 1998.
• The miscarriage of justice perpetrated on Dean Lyons, a homeless
drug addict, who has died subsequently, who was wrongfully
charged in 1997 with a double murder after signing a false
confession.
57. See, for example, the pithy reasoning in the 1964 US case of Escobedo v Illinois
378 US 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 which (quoting Wigmore) stated
as follows: "Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer
morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and
to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The exercise
of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of
that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to
resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to answer,
there soon seems to be the right to the expected answer - that is, to a confession of
guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent
are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system."
58. J. Healy, Irish Laws of Evidence (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2004), pA15.
59. Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women s Rights (Dublin,
December 8, 2003). See also the comments of Garda commissioner Noel Conroy
at the Annual Conference of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors in Kilkenny in March
2005 where he noted: "Recent reporting of high profile cases suggests a criminal
justice system in need of examination, with the burden of proof on the prosecution
now set so high as to be in most prosecutions, almost unachievable and the search
for truth being sacrificed in a web of technicalities." Irish Times, March 23, 2005,
p.4.
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• The Morris Tribunal which was established in March 2002
to investigate serious complaints of garda abuse in Donegal
including hoax explosives and bomb making equipment finds,
allegations of harassment and extortion and abuses in custody.
• Claims of garda mistreatment by the European Committee for
the Prevention of Torture after visiting Ireland in 1993, 1998 and
2002.
Despite such garda abuses.t" there remains a strong commitment to
"thickening" the maximum periods of detention in Ireland, whilst also
"thinning out" the prerequisites surrounding the interrogation particularly
as regards the rights to silence and access to a solicitor. Moreover, and
aside from the extension of Garda powers of detention which facilitate
the determination of guilt by executive rather than judicial processes, the
executive itself has also been increasingly empowered to dispense "low
visibility justice" and encourage citizens to avoid traditional adversarial
justice through the use of on-the-spot fines, penalty points and fixed penalty
notices for certain offences. Although this emphasis on "bureaucratization"
and executive convenience is not necessarily always repressive, it does
constitute evidence of the reconfiguration that is taking place in certain areas
of the justice system."
In addition, the system has witnessed restrictions on the right to bail. It
had been thought that it would be unconstitutional to refuse bail simply on
the ground that the applicant might commit further offences/" In the Director
of Public Prosecutions v Ryan." Walsh J. noted: "The criminalising of mere
intention has been usually a badge of an oppressive or unjust system." A
refusal of bail, accordingly, was only justified on two grounds: (a) where
there was a possibility that the accused might abscond; (b) where there was
a likelihood that the accused might tamper with evidence or interfere with
witnesses. Following a bail referendum in 1996, the grounds for refusing bail
have now been widened to include the commission of a serious offence."
This implicit recognition that public protection should trump an individual's
liberty interests moves the bail laws out of the realm of merely ensuring
the integrity of the judicial process and into the domain of legitimating
60. On Garda accountability, see D. Walsh, The Irish Police: a legal and constitutional
analysis (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998); D. Walsh, "The Proposed
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission: a Critique" (2004) 14(1) I.C.L.J. 2-12;
D Walsh, "The Proposed Garda Complaints Procedure: a Critique" (2004) 14(4)
I.C.L.J. 2-26-.
61. D. Walsh, The Irish Police: a legal and constitutional analysis (Dublin: Round
Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), pp.8-9.
62. See People v 0 'Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501.
63. [1989] I.R. 399 at 407.
64. See Art.40.4.1° of the Irish Constitution. See also s.2(2) of the Bail Act 1997.
See also M.P. O'Higgins, "Bail- A Privilege or a Right" (1998) 3(7) Bar Review
318-21; D Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell,
2002), pp.491-556.
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preventive detention-and the consequent limitations on the presumption of;
innocence-on the basis of forecasted but unconsummated offences."
Moreover, the hallowed notion that proof beyond reasonable doubt is
among the essentials of due process and fair treatment has now also begun
to look a little more hollow. The crystallisation of a legal burden of proof
into a beyond reasonable doubt formula was of course designed to impress
upon the prosecution the need for something approaching a state of certitude
given the consequences at stake for the individual accused and the values at
play in a free society." Itwas premised on the bedrock value determination
that the false negative error (that guilty individuals should go free) was
far outweighed by the false positive error (that innocent individuals be
convicted). The notion that some innocent people might become enmeshed
in the nets that ensnared the guilty was thought too unpalatable for free
and democratic societies. Though the "golden thread" principle, sometimes
referred to as the Woolmington or legal burden of proof principle, that it is
the duty of the prosecution to prove every element of the offence, has long
been accepted in Ireland, small cracks have begun to appear in the form of
judicial interpretations of statutory "reverse onus" provisions. In 0 'Leary
v Attorney General, Costello J. noted: "[T]he Constitution should not be
construed as absolutely prohibiting the Oireachtas [the Irish legislature]
from restricting the exercise of the right to a presumption of innocence ...
[I]t seems to me that the Oireachtas is permitted to restrict the exercise of the
right because it is not to be regarded as an absolute right whose enjoyment
can never be abridged"?
65. See also Pt 2 of the new Criminal Justice Act 2007 which permits the prosecution
authorities to more effectively challenge bail applications through, inter alia, the
introduction of opinion evidence by a Garda Chief Superintendent, the use of
electronic monitoring in circumstances where bail is conditional, and power to the
prosecution to appeal against the grant of bail or the conditions of bail.
66. As Stephen noted in 1883: "The plea of not guilty puts everything in issue, and the
prosecutor has to prove everything that he alleges from the very beginning. If it be
asked why an accused person is presumed to be innocent, I think the true answer
is, not that the presumption is probably true, but that society in the present day is so
much stronger than the individual, and is capable of inflicting so much more harm
on the individual than the individual as a rule can inflict upon society, that it can
afford to be generous." As quoted in F. McAuley and lP. McCuthcheon, Criminal
Liability: A Grammar (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p.34.; see
also J. Lea, Crime and Modernity (London: Sage, 2002), p.166.
67. [1991] I.L.R.M. 454, at 461. See also Hardy v Ireland [1994] 2 I.R. 550; U. Ni
Raifeartaigh, (1995) "Reversing the Onus of Proof in a Criminal Trial" (1995) 5(2)
I.C.L.1. 135-155; D. McGrath, Evidence (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2005),
para.2.26. Ashworth suggests that there are currently four specific threats to the
presumption of innocence: "confinement, by defining offences so as to reduce the
impact of the presumption; erosion, by recognizing more exceptiosn, evasions,
by introducing civil law procedures in order to circumvent the rights conferred
on accused persons;, and, side-stepping, by imposing restrictions on the liberty
of unconvicted persons [such as restrictions on telephone and intemet use, and
meetings with other people]". A. Ashworth, "Four Threats to the Presumption of
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The "downwards pressure" on the standard of proof is also evident more
generally. Provisions for the imposition of sex offender orders where there
are reasonable grounds for believing they are necessary; refusal of bail where
it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent the commission of further
offences; confiscation of a criminal assets post conviction on the balance
of probabilities, 68 and seizure of the proceeds of crime in the absence of a
criminal conviction on the balance ofprobabilities-these are all indicative
of increased support for a risk management standard, premised on efficiency
rather than certainty, as opposed to a more traditional criminal standard that
placed a premium on accuracy and was designed to afford individuals every
possible benefit of law. Such measures are no longer driven by respect for
due process values and civil liberty safeguards that guarantee some element
of parity between the state and those accused of crime in the criminal arena.
Instead they are organized around a desire to maximize efficiency, enhance
control and minimize risk.
Finally, a partial reorientation of the structural properties governing
sentencing has become evident in Ireland. There is increased evidence of
attempts being made to reduce the art of sentencing in Ireland-which up
to recently was relatively unstructured-to a Procrustean formula which
mechanically fits punishment to crime. Increases in the maximum penalties
allowed by statute for various types of offences; calls for sentencing policy to
be founded on just deserts; provision for the Director of Public Prosecutions
to appeal unduly lenient sentences imposed on conviction on indictment; and
increased control of groups of offenders such as under the Sex Offenders Act
2001 all signpost the changes occurring in sentencing practices. Moreover,
a scheme of presumptive sentencing was provided for under the Criminal
Justice Act 1999 (the "1999 Act"). Section 4 of the 1999Act created a new
offence of possession of controlled drugs worth €13,OOOor more with intent
to supply (now s.15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (the "1977 Act").
A person convicted of the new offence, other than a child or young person,
would have a term of at least 10 years imposed on him or her unless there
were exceptional circumstances that would permit a derogation.
Section 82 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 (the "2006 Act") creates the
new offence of importation of controlled drugs of €13,000 or more (now
s.15B of the 1977 Act). This offence also carries the 10 year presumptive
sentence. Moreover, when the courts are considering ifthere are exceptional
and specific circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence than 10 years for
these drug offences, they are now permitted to consider if the accused has
a previous conviction for a drug trafficking offence, and whether the public
interest in preventing drug trafficking would be served by the imposition
of a lesser sentence. The 1977Act also provides that where a person, other
than a child or young person, is convicted of a second or subsequent offence
Innocence", Ben Beinart Memorial Lecture, August 10, 2005, University of Cape
Town.
68. See A. Von Hirsch and M. Wasik, "Civil Disqualification attending Conviction: a
suggested conceptual framework" [1997] C.L.J. 599.
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under ss.15A or 15B, or is convicted of a first offence under one of these;
sections and already has a conviction under the other, the court must specify
a straight minimum sentence to be served of at least 10 years. Notification
requirements, broadly similar to those used for sex offenders, have also been
introduced under Pt 9 of the 2006 Act. These requirements relate to those
convicted on indictment of drug trafficking offences who have been sent
to prison for more than a year," The 2006 Act also introduces presumptive
minimum and mandatory minimum sentences for firearms and related
offences." Increasingly, therefore, the demand for more mechanical justice
and fixity of purpose in sentencing in Ireland requires that the severity of
the punishment match ever more closely the seriousness of the offence. As
Garland noted:
"The shift of sentencing policy towards mandatory penalties,
sentencing guidelines and just deserts ... has the effect of focusing
attention firmly upon process and away from outcome. When
sentencing becomes merely the application of pre-existing penalty
tariffs, it loses much of its former social purpose. It shifts away
from the older framework in which sentencers aimed to bring about
a social outcome-the reduction of crime through individualised
sentencing-to one where the key objective (fitting the punishment
to the offence) is well within the capacity Of the courts, and much
less likely to fail."71
The exigencies of law enforcement in Ireland increasingly now demands
much closer adherence to an "assembly line" model of justice in which
the State-individual balance is increasingly tipped in favour of the former.
This has been achieved by dismantling some of the previous "ceremonious
69. The notification periods are: (i) 12 years if the sentence imposed was life
imprisonment; (ii) 7 years if the sentence imposed was greater than 10 years
imprisonment; (iii) 5 years if the sentence imposed was one of imprisonment
between 5 and 10 years; and, 3 years if the sentence imposed was one of
imprisonment between one and five years. The notification periods are halved for
persons under the age of 18 at the time the sentence is imposed.
70. There is a presumptive minimum sentence of 10 years for possession or control of
firearms or ammunition with intent to endanger life; or for the use or production
of a firearm or imitation firearm while resisting arrest or aiding an escape from
custody. There is a presumptive 5 year sentence for offences such as the possession
of a firearm or imitation firearm while taking a vehicle or carrying a firearm or
imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, or for shortening the
barrel of a shotgun or rifle. For persons over 18 who commit a subsequent firearms
offence, the court must specify a mandatory minimum sentence to be served. For
repeat offenders to whom the presumptive 10 year minimum originally applied,
the mandatory minimum is set at 10 years for the repeat offence. In all other cases,
the mandatory minimum for the repeat offence is set at 5 years.
71. D. Garland, The Culture of Control: C;ime and Social Order in Contemporary
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.120.
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rituals" which cluttered up the process of justice and succeeded in blinding
Damocles." Any voices of discontent are met with the common-sense
mantras that the "public must be protected" and "the innocent have nothing to
fear". Increased powers of search and seizure, an expansion in the range and
length of incommunicado custodial interrogations, restrictions on the right
to silence and bail, curtailments on sentencing discretion, and the increasing
"downwards pressure" on criminal standards of proof all evince this trend
towards a more results-orientated system of justice.
OBFUSCATING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL BOUNDARIES
The employment of criminal law as the monopoly mechanism for dealing
with deviant behaviour is also beginning to fragment and blur. In particular,
the diversification and diffusion of the State into the civil sphere as a means
of crime control is becoming more visible in Ireland. This move away from
the traditional condemnatory "prosecution-conviction-sentencing" approach
to deviant behaviour may to some extent be seen (through a benevolent lens)
as a willingness to move beyond the harsh consequences of criminalisation.
It seems more likely however that recent embrace of civil measures is more
closely connected with the perceived ineffectiveness of the criminal law
mechanism. The principled protections of the criminal process-premised
on a criminal sanctioning model of justice --can more easily be circumvented
by directing the flow of power into this parallel system of civil justice.
Though this phenomenon is rapidly occurring, our due process defences have
remained static, firmly fastened to the place inhabited by criminal law. They
remain enmeshed in the fixity of definition and are incapable of contending
with the plasticity and fluidity of the flow of power into civil spaces.
Perhaps nowhere is this ruse of placing sanctioning powers in the civil
rather than criminal realm more palpable than in relation to the enactment of
measures by which the proceeds of crime can be confiscated. The Proceeds
of Crime Bill, one of the great successes of Irish law enforcement, was
mooted in Ireland in 1996 to combat the dangers posed to society by drug-
related crime. It was initially proposed as a private member's Bill, one week
after the assassination of Veronica Guerin." Five weeks later, the normally
sluggish legislative process was complete and the Proceeds of Crime Act
was law. The Act's cardinal feature permits the Criminal Assets Bureau
(CAB) to secure interim and interlocutory orders against a person's property,
provided that it can demonstrate that the specified property-which has a
value in excess of€13,OOO--constitutes, directly or indirectly, the proceeds
of crime. If the interlocutory order survives in force for a period of seven
72. See H. Packer, The Limits a/the Criminal Sanction (Palo Alto, California: Stanford
University Press, 1968), p.159.
73. See J. Meade "Organised Crime, Moral Panic and Law Reform: the Irish Adoption
of Civil Forfeiture" (2000) 10(1) I.C.L.J., 11-16.
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years," an application for disposal can then be made. This extinguishes all
rights in the property that the respondent party may have had.
The speed with which the legislation was introduced is a cause of
concern, not least because of the manner in which it seeks to circumvent
criminal procedural safeguards guaranteed under Art.38 of the Constitution.
In particular, the legislation authorises the confiscation of property in,
the absence of a criminal conviction; permits the introduction of hearsay
evidence; lowers the threshold of proof to the balance of probabilities; and
requires a party against whom an order is made to produce evidence in
relation to his or her property and income to rebut the suggestion that the
property constitutes the proceeds of crime." This practice of pursuing the
criminal money trail through the civil jurisdiction-thereby immunising
the State from the strictures of criminal due process embodied in the
Constitution-raises all sorts of civil liberty concerns about hearsay evidence,
the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. Moreover, and given
the revenue producing capacity of the Criminal Assets Bureau, the temptation,
as Lea notes, "to displace concerns of justice with those of revenue flows
cannot be ruled out"."
Furthermore, under s.S of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, CAB
is also required to ensure that the proceeds of criminal activity or suspected
criminal activity are subjected to tax." In raising a tax assessment, CAB,
in fully applying the Revenue Acts to the proceeds' of criminal activity, has
considerable powers to require a taxpayer to furnish details of earnings and
assets," and to obtain orders freezing monies and assets. The taxpayer has
30 days within which to appeal the assessment." Before an appeal can take
place, however, the taxpayer must pay an amount of tax not less than the
amount which would be payable on foot of his/her own tax returns.f Non-
payment of this tax within the 30 days renders the assessment by CAB final
74. See also s.7 of the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005.
75. J.P. McCutcheon, and D. Walsh, "Seizure of Criminal Assets: An Overview" (1999)
9(2) I.C.L.J. 127-32.
76. J. Lea, (2001) "Crime Control and Civil Liberties", available at http://www.
bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.ukl. See also J. Lea, "Hitting Criminals Where it
Hurts: Organised Crime and the Erosion of Due Process" (2004) 35 Cambrian L.R.
81-96.
77. In Hayes v Duggan [1929] l.R. 406, the Irish Supreme Court had held that
profits derived from a criminal enterprise could not be supposed to be within the
contemplation of income tax legislation. See also Collins v Mulvey [1956] I.R.
223. Section 19 of the Finance Act 1983, however permitted the State to assess
and collect tax on profits that arose from unlawful sources or activities. Section 19
has since been replaced by s.58 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.
78. The DPP should not however profit from any such disclosure for the purpose of
any future criminal prosecution. See M v D (unreported, High Court, December
10,1996).
79. See s.933(1)(a) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.
80. See s.957(2)(a) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. See also Keogh v Criminal
Assets Bureau [2004] 2 I.R. 159.
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and conclusive. In challenging the assessment, the question of whether or not
the profits or gains were the result of criminal activity must be disregarded.
Once the assessment becomes final and conclusive, CAB can then seek to
enforce the assessment under various statutory powers. It may also seek
to exercise the powers which it operates in conjunction with the DPP in
relation to the criminal prosecution of revenue offences (knowingly or
wilfully failing to make returns, or making incorrect returns). In light of the
strengthening of revenue powers and their far-reaching nature, the Revenue
Powers Group recently called for "key restraints" on the use of such powers
and for the need to enhance the protections and safeguards for taxpayers.
No rebalancing has however taken place and CAB appears to have come to
rely more on its powers to tax than its power to seize the proceeds of crime,
the former not requiring a seven year period before finality, or causing the
same complications with regard to third party rights.
Concerns about CAB's powers to seize and tax proceeds of crime
are counterpoised by the simple legal appeal to the civil as opposed to
the criminal design of the provisions. This reasoning, which has judicial
imprimatur, is, to some extent however, an exercise in obfuscation. As was
noted in another context, "[one can] merely redefine any measure which is
claimed to be punishment as regulation and, magically, the Constitution no
longer prohibits its imposition.'?" It is difficult to dislodge the perception
that such a device permits the Irish state to achieve late-modem criminal
justice goals-public protection, targeting, stigmatisation and threat
neutralisation-in a civil setting.
Measures such as the Proceeds of CrimeAct 1996might best be described
as falling under a schema of criminal administration, a cost-efficient form
of legitimate coercion which jettisons the orthodox safeguards of criminal
law (the requirements of criminal guiit,82proof beyond reasonable doubt,
obligations of discovery in criminal proceedings, proportionality of
punishment to offence seriousness and the presumption of innocence) but
which continues to embody criminal indicia including the moral opprobrium
associated with the prohibited conduct and the capacity to stigmatise. In
addition to the absence of safeguards, this schema also, however, displays
another important difference from the traditional criminal law. Provisions
that seize or tax the proceeds of crime are not designed to re-orientate human
behaviour or to reintegrate those that are deviant. Instead, their focus is more
"apersonal" in orientation (albeit with the sanctioning potential to stigmatise
81. See United States v Salerno 481 U.S. 739 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95, L. Ed. 2d, 697
(1987). For judicial detenninations that the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 passes
constitutional muster, see Michael Murphy v GM, PB, PC, GH; John Gilligan v
CAB, Revenue Commissioners, The Garda Commissioner, Ireland and the Attorney
General [2001] 4 LR. 113. See also Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] LR.
326.
82. On mens rea more generally, see F. McAuley and J.P.McCutcheon, Criminal
Liability: A Grammar (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp.273-
312.
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and exclude) which is not surprising given that they are applied in rem rather
than in personam. They are tailored to sweep up the material proceeds of
the crime rather than fit the broad range of individuated circumstances of
wrongdoer. They transform "person punishment into threat neutralisation,
and criminal law into criminal administration" in the "public interest"."
The primary impetus for this model was derived, once again, from the,
terrorist domain where the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act
1985 empowered the Minister for Justice to certify that money held in
banks which was the property of the IRA should be forfeited and vested in
the Minister," This certification by the Minister was not dependent on the
initiation of criminal proceedings. The Act contained further provisions
entitling a person who claimed to be the owner of the money to apply to the
High Court for an order directing the return of the money if he or she could
demonstrate that it was not the proceeds from the operations of an unlawful
organisation." Indeed, and in something of a reversal of the established
position in Ireland of political imitation and policy transfer from other
jurisdictions, the "structure and modus operandi of the Criminal Assets
Bureau have been identified as models for other countries which are in the
process of targeting the proceeds of crime.?"
The introduction of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders under the 2006 Act
offers further evidence of this civilising strategy. It too can be viewed as a
"regulatory-disciplinary" approach to crime prevention which criminalises
through "the back door of civil injunctions". The 2006 Act, inter alia, gives
power to the Gardai to issue a behaviour warning (which will remain in
force for at least three months) to adults under Pt 11 and to children under
83. See R. Pound, 'The Future of the Criminal Law' (1921) 21 Colum. L. Rev. 16. See
also K. Mann, "Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal
and Civil Law" (1992) 101 Yale L.J. 1795-1871; and S.R. Klein, "Redrawing the
Criminal-Civil Boundary" (1999) 2 Buff. Crirn. L. R. 681- 723.
84. See Clancy v Ireland [1988] I.R. 326 where the High Court held that the 1985 Act
was a permissible delimitation on property rights and was not a breach of fairness
of procedures. Other impetuses for the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 would include
legislative initiatives in the United States in the early 1970s and a number of
international conventions on drug trafficking, money laundering, confiscation of
the proceeds of crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
85. In introducing the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985 (the "1985
Act"), the then Minister for Justice recognised the draconian powers conferred but
justified it having regard to the "evils of the IRA". He also gave a firm assurance
that it would never be used lightly. Indeed the 1985 Act only had a life span of
three months and was only ever used in that one specific case. When introducing
the Proceeds of Crime Bill in 1996, its initiator, Mr John O'Donoghue, noted its
"extraordinary" lineage: "The suggestion that this Bill is in some unspecified way
unconstitutional is equally unsustainable. A clear and direct precedent exists for
legislation of this type. The Offences Against the State Act, 1985, permits the
freezing of assets of illegal organizations. The constitutionality of that Act was
tested in the High Court in Clancy v Ireland ... " Dail Eireann, vol. 467, col. 2409,
2nd July 2, 1996.
86. See Criminal Assets Bureau, Annual Report 1999 (Dublin, 2000), p.5.
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Pt 13 who have behaved in an anti-social manner. As regards adults, there
is no requirement that a member of the Gardai must have witnessed the
anti-social behaviour. Indeed the warning can be issued at any time within
one month of the behaviour taking place." Failure to comply may result in
a senior member of the Gardai applying to the District Court for an order
prohibiting the person from engaging in certain defined behaviour (which can
remain in place for a maximum period of two years). Such an order will be
granted on the civil standard of proof (without the protections that normally
apply to criminal proceedings), but breach of the order will constitute a
criminal offence. Anti-social behaviour itself is defined in vague and very
broad terms" giving rise to the potential for arbitrariness, net widening and
the promotion of exclusion. As Walsh said about the employment of such
orders for adults:
"Arguably the police are being used as a proxy to extend the reach
of the criminal process into territory that traditionally had been the
preserve of the civil process. Although they are a constituent element
of the criminal process, they will be imposing severe restraints on
the freedom of the individual to engage in behaviour which was not,
is not, and probably never will be, criminal. It is tantamount to the
development of a quasi-criminal process under the control of the
police. For those affected it will appear as if they are being treated as
criminals without the benefit of the traditional process. Their liberty
is restrained not by reference to the publicly promulgated standards
of the criminal law, but by what an individual member of the Garda
deems to be anti-social behaviour. Moreover, the decision to impose
the restraint is rooted in the low visibility exercise of executive
discretion by a police officer on the ground, rather than in the public
transparent environment of a court chaired by an independent
judge.t'"
87. As Walsh suggests: "The restraint can be imposed through an exercise of low
visibility discretion on the street by an executive agent of the state. By any standards
that reflects a significant transfer of power in criminal matters from the courts to
the Garda. It is further evidence of the emergence of a second tier criminal process
operated by the police." D. Walsh, "Police Powers in the Criminal Justice Act, 2006:
the triumph of executive convenience over judicial checks and balances", Thomson
Round Hall Criminal Law Conference, Royal College of Surgeons, November 25,
2006, at p. 10. A similar provision now exists for children under s.257A of the
Children Act, 200 I, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2006.
88. See s.113(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.
89. D. Walsh, "Police Powers in the Criminal Justice Act, 2006: the triumph of executive
convenience over judicial checks and balances", Thomson Round Hall Criminal Law
Conference 2006, Royal College of Surgeons, November 25, 2006, at 10-1l.
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ENHANCING PUBLIC PROTECTION
All of the changes outlined above are grounded in the need for greater public
protection and security. So, for example, when the Offences Against the State
Review Committee recently argued for the retention of the non-jury Special
Criminal Court, it did so on the basis that the threat posed by organised crime
alone is sufficient to justify its maintenance. No qualitative or quantitative
evidence was provided; nor did any comprehensive debate take place as to
whether such crime tipped the balance in favour of enhancing security or
preventing the loss ofliberties. Much of the reasoning behind retaining the
Court was premised on the notion that "there have been instances in recent
times where it appears that attempts have been made to tamper with juries in
high-profile criminal trials in the ordinary courts."? Permitting a permanent
state of exception to envelope the constitutional right to a jury trial on the
paltry nature of such consequentialist evidence seems to cast doubt on the
very notion of the actual right. As Dworkin noted:
"[T]hose constitutional rights that we call fundamental ... are
supposed to represent rights against Government in the strong sense .
. . . I must not overstate the point. Someone who claims that the citizens
have a right against the Government need not go so far as to say that
the State is never justified in overriding that right. ... What he cannot
do is to say that the Government is justified in overriding a right on
the minimal grounds that would be sufficient if no such right existed.
He cannot say that the Government is entitled to act on no more than
a judgment that its act is likely to produce, overall, a benefit to the
community. That admission would make his claim of a right pointless,
and would show him to be using some sense of 'right' other than in
the strong sense necessary to give his claim the political importance
it is normally taken to have. [emphasis added]"?'
On the other hand, the needs of public protection and security are, of course,
"essential goods" which are necessary for our self-preservation, well-being
and happiness. They must be factored into any consideration of the right
to a jury trial. Interference with jury decision-making, for example, would
threaten these goods by impairing the ability of citizens to enjoy the fruits
of fair justice and public order. For these reasons alone, such occurrences
must be considered in the context of security and the need to enable justice to
take place in an environment which is free from the threat of injury or harm.
Public protection and order are objectives, as Ashworth has noted, "that we
should all support, because what we want for ourselves, our families, our
friends and indeed our fellow citizens is to be able to flourish in our lives
90. "Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939 to
1998 and related matters" (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2001).
91. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Dutchworth, 1977), pp.191-92.
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without risk of assaults on our persons or property"." In some respects, the
ideology ofliberallegalism and constitutionalism seems ill-fitted to contend
with the social and cultural transformations that have taken place in recent
decades, particularly the long-term increase in crime rates that jeopardizes
our ability to flourish in our lives. As Loader has noted:
"Liberal elistism made sense in, or was at least fitted to, a world
where crime was less prevalent an act and more settled as a cultural
category; a world where people evinced trust and deference towards
social authority and had more patient expectations of government;
a world marked by greater equality and solidarity and less ambient
precariousness and insecurity. Such an outlook speaks less well to
a society where crime has become a recurrent feature of everyday
life; where the anxieties and demands it generates are widely and
excitedly disseminated by the mass media; where reduced levels
of trust in the institutions of government coincide with heightened
public demands of them; where consumerism threatens to eclipse
citizenship as the organizing political principle-and symbol of
belonging-of the age. "93
In such an environment, there are solid reasons why the constitutive tenets
of liberal legalism and constitutionalism should at least be revisited and
challenged. Recently in Ireland, however, there has been too much micro
focus on technologies of protection and the repression of particular instances
of criminal conduct and insufficient macro analysis of how protection and
security can best be maintained in a society which continues to respect
individual rights. We need, as Hudson notes, 'to balance the description
and analysis of the strengthening and deepening penetration of governance
in the name of providing security, with the Enlightenment elaboration of
theories of justice and boundaries oflegitimate authority which ... set limits
to governance' .94 Two paradigms of security dominate the debate which
92. A.Ashworth, "The Criminal Justice Act 2003: Criminal Justice Reform: Principles,
Human Rights and Public Protection" July 2004 Crim. L.R., 516-32 at 516.
93. 1. Loader, "Fall of the Platonic Guardians: liberalism, criminology and political
responses to crime in England and Wales" (2003) 43(1) Brit. J. Criminol. 46(4)
561-86.
94. B. Hudson, "Punishment, Rights and Difference: defending justice in the risk
society" in K. Stenson and R, Sullivan (eds), Crime, Risk and Justice: the politics of
crime control in liberal democracies (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2001), pp. 144-72
at p.146. The issue of security is now also increasingly being addressed at an EU
level. See E. Regan and P. O'Mahony, "The Third Pillar of the European Union:
the emerging structure of EU police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
and its impact on Irish criminal justice and civil liberties" in P. O'Mahony (ed.),
Criminal Justice in Ireland (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2002),
pp.297-323. For more recent developments, see, for example, the speeches ofMr
Michael McDowell on the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security
and justice in Europe, which was adopted by the European Council on November
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arguably must be superseded." The security lobby encourages its pursuit as an
unqualified human good, yet overlooks how this may produce human rights
abuses and fails to ask whether it is really crime that is producing insecurity.
The liberty lobby believes that the pursuit of security is a dangerous idea
given its repressive potential and should be curbed by the strict invocation
of rights. By dismissing claims to security and construing rights primarily
as a bulwark against the collective, the liberty lobby cedes too much ground
to the first position by failing to ask how people can best relate to each other
in conditions of secure interdependence that allows each to flourish.
The common currency now in Irish political and media circles is that
restrictions on due process rights will enhance security in keeping with
the needs of the majority of good-living, decent Irish folk. As the former
Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, noted: "Time and time again one
hears repeated voicing of disquiet that the rights of society to be protected
take second place in the quest to ensure fairness to the suspect - in other
words that the balance has shifted too far in favour of the accused. I believe
this is a legitimate concern which must be addressed.'?" Indeed, in setting
out his intention to establish a committee to consider how the criminal
justice system might be rebalanced, in a speech in Limerick in October
2006, McDowell noted:
"I want ... to raise the possibility that we, as a society, must now face
up to difficult questions, not as a substitute for good and effective
policing and criminal investigation, but as a means of ensuring
that the scales of justice are held evenly between those who would
break the law and those who would uphold it, between the accused
and the prosecutor and between the criminal, the victim and the
community.':"
The Minister went on to suggest that in looking at the imbalance, particular
attention should be given to the right to silence, character evidence, the
exclusionary rule, modifications of the double jeopardy rule, the need for
5, 2004, available at http://www.iiea.comleventsxphp?event_id=44 and on the
changes a European Constitution will have for criminal justice in Ireland, which
was delivered at a National Forum on Europe Seminar held on May 12, 2005,
and available at http://wwwforeignaffairs.gov.ie/Press _ReZeasesI2005051211756.
htm.
95. See I.Loader and N. Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
96. Dail Debates, vol 597, February 15,2005.
97. See "Rebalancing Criminal Justice"-Remarks by Tanaiste in Limerick, 20th
October, 2006, available at http://www.justice.ie/80256EOl003A02CF/vWeb/
pcJUSQ6UTMDB-en. For the Interim Report of the Balance in the Criminal Law
Review Group (January 31,2007), see http://www.justice.ie/80256EOl0039C5AF/
vWebIjlDOJA6YDN79-enl$FilellnterimReportpdf For the Final Report, see http://
www.justice.ieI802 56EO1003 9C5AFlv WebljlDOJA 6ZKHEN-enl$FileIBalanceRpt.
pdf
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greater obligations to be imposed on the accused to disclose his defence
to the prosecution before presenting it in court at the trial, and the need to
expand the role of the prosecutor at sentencing stage.
Many of the arguments in favour of rebalancing, however, though strong
on utility, expediency, "othering"," emotional narratives of risk and safety,"
and appeals to common-sense authoritarianism and simple majoritarianism,
are weak on evidence-based criteria and broader considerations of strategy
implications. Is there, for example, and to paraphrase Ashworth, a simple
hydraulic nexus between hardening the rules against accuseds and better
protection of victims and citizens? Will a deliberate strategy of punitiveness
better guarantee security? How much protection for individual citizens can
the criminal justice system actually provide? Are their other media, such
as those involving employment, education and housing, through which
crime prevention can be orchestrated'i'" To what extent can the right to
security "trump" other individual rights? 101When does this reified notion
of security stop being a utility and start being a disutilty?102How much of
our own social security depends on other considerations such as education,
health, employment, social services, transportation and the environment?
How prepared are we to channel resources away from these areas into crime
control? Towhat extent can rights secured by justice be subject to "political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interests'Y'" In assuming that the
majority ofIrish citizens place little value on freedom from lengthy pre-trial
detentions, downwards pressures on standards of proof, restrictions on the
right to silence, and increased powers of detention, is it correct to suppose
that a clear demarcation exists between the criminal minority and the law-
abiding majority? 104Though the "external preferences" ofIrish citizens may
98. As Garland notes: "We allow ourselves to forget what penal welfarism took for
granted: namely that offenders are citizens too and their liberty interests are our
liberty interests. The growth of a social and cultural divide between 'us' and 'them',
together with new levels offear and insecurity, has made many complacent about the
emergence of a more repressive state power." D. Garland, The Culture of Control:
Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), pp.181-82.
99. On the extent to which risk thinking is a neutral phenomenon, see P. O'Malley,
"The Government of Risks" in A Sarat (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Law
and Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp.292-308.
100. A. Ashworth, "Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism" (1996) Crim.
L.R. 220-30.
101. See R. Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1986).
102. On the paradoxes of security, see L. Zedner, "Too Much Security" (2003) 31 Int.
I.Socio1.Law 155-84.
103. I.A, Rawls, A Theory 0/ Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1999 repr.)
pp.3~.
104. A. Ashworth, "Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism" (1996) Crim.
L.R. 220-30, at 225. For example, the total value of property stolen in burglaries,
larcenies and robberies in Ireland in 2002 was €97 million; in the same year, the
revenue commissioners collected over €600 million from DIRT and bogus non-
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be for the assignment of more powers to the Gardai against those accused
of crime, are these also their "personal preferences" for themselves? For
example, though the Gardai have repeatedly called for more powers in the
fight against crime, the very due process rights that they seek to dismantle
against those accused of crime are also employed by them on occasion
when the finger of suspicion is pointed at their own members. As PJ Stone,
General Secretary of the Garda Representative Association, noted about
the Gardai under investigation as a result of the Morris Tribunal findings:
"It is acknowledged that a small number of people have sullied the good
name of the force but these people have also to be dealt with according to
due process and constitutionally afforded the right of every other citizen to
accountfor their actions [emphasis added]."!" Such considerations are rarely,
if ever, teased OUt.I06 Instead, justifications for the trade-off are purchased
through the claim that the benefits of increased security will exceed lost
freedom-this claim, more often than not, is buttressed by reference to the
needs of the "silent majority" of Irish people, and the hubristic assurance
that the "innocent have nothing to fear".
Moreover, this erosion of institutional restraints and balances appears to
be carved out on the back of political expediency, as a means of "governing
through crime't.'?' The neo-conservative image of a strong sovereign
state has been promoted and maintained in Ireland through, in part, the
valorisation of law as the panacea for serious criminal ills. Increasingly
the criminal law is viewed as the perfect conduit through which to direct
collective and righteous demands for vengeance. The grammar of the law
itself easily accommodates such a function. In keeping with its "classical"
genealogy, it has for the most part remained autonomous in orientation and
has remained closely tethered to the formulaic individual subject-homo
resident account investigations, €43 million for unauthorized offshore investments
sold by National Irish Bank, and €21 million for Ansbacher Deposits. The DIRT
inquiry itself related to 35,000 non-resident accounts that had Irish addresses
associated with them. See S. Kilcommins et ai, Crime Punishment and the Search
for Order in Ireland (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2004), p.131.
105. The Irish Times, June 21, 2005. p.14.
106. Indeed it can be also argued that those putting forward a civil libertarian agenda
in Ireland have often not teased it out, preferring instead to rely on broad, often
abstract, liberalist arguments about the need to restrain state power and protect the
privacy rights of individuals. Such arguments, which though necessarily qualitative
rather than quantitative in nature, often miss their intended public audience, not
least because they do not engage with the social, cultural and political realities of
crime in late modem society.
107. J. Simon, "Governing Through Crime" in L.M. Friedman and G. Fisher, (eds), The
Crime Conundrum: Essays on Criminal Justice (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press,
1997) pp. 172-89 . See also 1. Simon, "Visions of Self- Control: fashioning a liberal
approach to crime and punishment in the twentieth century" in A. Sarat et ai, (eds),
Looking Back at Law s Century (London and Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 2002) pp. 109-50. In more parochial terms, this has been referred to as the
need not to be part of the "can't do anything, won't do anything brigade". See Dail
Debates, vol.547, col. II 3, January 30, 2002, per Mr O'Donoghue.
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juridicus. 108 Throughout the twentieth century, a clear divergence became
evident in most western countries between the algebraic perceptions of the
individual as presented in law, and the causal/social perceptions as presented
by correctionalist criminology. The trial stage, for the most part, adopted
the former; the sentencing stage, the latter. More recently, a re-convergence
is taking place as criminological discourse jettisons the "biographical"
individual in favour of the "abiographical" individual or "rational choice
actor". 109 Classical legalism and the contemporary criminologies are at idem
once again in coding responsibility to focus solely on the wrongdoer. The one-
dimensional, one-size, homo juridicus, increasingly fits all criminological
and legal representations of the "Individual".
Curiously, and as noted in the introduction, this "agnosticism" towards
correctionalist criminology has not, however, occurred in Ireland to the
same extent as countries such as the US and England and Wales, given that
the discipline is still relatively young. The focus continues to rest somewhat
on "deprivation rather than depravity"."? Nevertheless, and despite this
peculiarity, it is legalism of the classical variety which forms the central
plank in penal discourse in Ireland, with correctionalist discourse very
much confined to a peripheral role. Whenever security or order is threatened
within the state, it is almost always coercive law which is the medium called
upon to provide a solution. This is all very much part of the "acting out"
stratagem described by Garland. As he notes: "Policymaking becomes a form
of acting out that downplays the complexities and long-term character of
effective crime control in favour of the immediate gratifications of a more
expressive alternative. Law making becomes a matter of retaliatory gestures
intended to reassure a worried public and to accord with common sense,
however poorly those gestures are adaptedto dealing with the underlying
problem.?'!' The intense outrage produced by certain crimes, coupled with
the demands for the State to reassert its power through the criminal justice
system, has resulted in the rise of more repressive penal laws-premised
on control rather than readjustment-that draw ever clearer lines between a
fearful public and "monstrous" criminals. The collapse of the Liam Keane
trial in the Central Criminal Court in November 2003, for example, brought
such a phenomenon in to sharp focus. The 19-year-old accused in the case
had been charged with the murder of Eric Leamy. The Director of Public
Prosecutions, however, directed that a nolle prosequi be entered after six
prosecution witnesses denied making statements identifying the accused
108. See N. Lacy, "In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social
Sciences in Criminal Law" (2001) 64(3) M.L.R. 350-71.
109. As Simon noted: "Forms of knowledge associated with the social have all
experienced downwards mobility." J. Simon. "Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy
in Late Modem America" (2000) 25 Law and Social Inquiry 1111--48, at 1113.
110. I.O'Donnell, I.and E. O'Sullivan, "The Politics of Intolerance - Irish Style" (2003)
43( 1) Brit. J. Criminol. 43( 1) 41-62.
111. D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at p.134.
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as being the man who stabbed the murder victim. The collapse of the trial,
and the obscene gesture given by Keane to the waiting press as he left the
court, immediately lead to claims about a "crime crisis"; suggestions that the
"fabric of society ... [was] at risk"; calls for more "anti-terrorist type laws" ;
and, a recognition by the Taoiseach that the Gardai "cannot take on a crowd
of gangsters with their peann luaidhes".'!". Such claims signify the extent
to which policymakers in Ireland have recognized the capacity of criminal
law to act as a catharsis for public anger and disquiet. 113
A Meadian analysis of such developments would no doubt note that the
law acts as a forum through which an "emotional solidarity of aggression"
can be expressed by the conscience collective. As Mead notes: "the majesty
of the law is that of the sword drawn against the common enemy."!" In times
of perceived crisis, calls are made for the sword to be sharpened-having
been dulled by a liberalist agenda-so as to strengthen the solidarity and
dominance of the group over the individual. This is particularly important
in Ireland at a time when it is experiencing an identity shift from being a
relatively homogeneous Catholic society to a more fluid, heterogeneous mix
of diversity. I IS Repressive laws directed at the outside "enemy" I 16 continues
to remain a glue that binds in a milieu that has witnessed the loss of many
traditional solidarity identifiers. Punishment, as Mead suggests, "provides
the most favourable condition for the sense of group solidarity because in
the common attack upon the common enemy the individual differences are
obliterated"."? From a political perspective, achieving an emotional and
populist solidarity through more punitive laws that exclude the criminal
from the group-however anodyne the impact long-term of such laws on
public protection-appears far less risky and requires far less commitment
and justificatory evidence than a "re constructive attitude" which focuses
on including the criminal within the group (through supportive policies
112. See Irish TImes, November 6, 2003, pp.6-7
113. Of course one should also recognize the capacity oflaw itself to act as a counterpoint
to repressive legal measures. See S. Kilcommins et ai, Crime Punishment and the
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on housing, employment, health and child care ).118 It is within this "acting
out"/"emotional solidarity of aggression" paradigm that we should begin to
see the "tooling up" of the State in Ireland and the dismantling of equality
of arms provisions.
CONCLUSION
Justice in the early twenty-first century is becoming more disaggregated and
embodies many contradictory dualities. It is, for example, more instrumental
but also more expressive. It involves more normative legitimacy for rights
based discourse, 119 but also more normalization of the "sites of exception".
It continues to emphasise protection from the State, but increasingly also
protection by the State. It is more inclusionary in seeking to accommodate
victims, witnesses and local communities but also more exclusionary
through, among other things, the expressive tone adopted in respect of
offenders and those accused of crime. It embodies more authoritarianism
but also more pluralism. It is more supra-national but also more local, more
statist but also more globalised. It continues to emphasise adversarialism,
but also encourages executive fact-finding and guilt determination in non-
court settings. It involves more monopolised criminal control but also more
fragmentation and blurring of boundaries. It is more focused on the poor
and socially excluded but it also appears to be directing its gaze at white
collar crime.
In this article, we have focused on only one thread of this disaggregation-
the repressive logic underpinning much of the reconsideration of State-
accused relations.'> Increasingly policymaking in relation to the issue of
crime is governed by the dictates of public and social protection at the expense
of the normative principles of justice. This trend, as regards accused rights, is
evident in three related fields. First, domestic criminal justice policymaking
has witnessed a gradual shift away from a "rights-based sphere of citizenship"
for those accused or suspected of committing crime to one where such
individuals are viewed as "agents of obligation". 121 Though the Irish criminal
118. On the positive capacity of punishment to forge solidarity, see E. Durkheim, The
Division of Labour in Society (London: Macmillan, 1984 repr).
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The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives (Devon & Portland Oregon:
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justice system continues to irradiate with due process values and ideals, calls
"for protection from the state" are increasingly been heard over demands "for
protection by the state". 122 Secondly, it is also evident in the hollowing out of
criminal law and the move towards a more administrative strategy in which
there is growing evidence of a conflation of previous distinctions between
criminal and civil domains. Finally, the criminal law itself is increasingly
also employed as the best solution for contending with the problems of
crime. This drift towards more repressive and expressive criminal laws
has been facilitated, in part, by the "metaphoric pathways" provided by the
long history of extraordinary law in Ireland and its anti-liberalist focus on
efficiency, security, public protection and friend/foe distinctions.
The direction and thrust of all of these various traits appear consistent
with Packer's crime control model of justice which adopts an instrumental
logic that favours the primacy of the public over the individual, promotes
the need for efficiency as regards criminal justice operations and outputs,
emphasizes at every turn the exercise of authoritarian state power, and
has as its validating authority a legislature'" "more concerned to subject
penal decision making to the discipline of party politics and short-term
political calculation" .124 Under such a regime the principles and values of
justice increasingly give way to the goal of providing security. In such an
environment, it is left to the Irishjudiciary to provide principled and sustained
opposition-particularly through liberal interpretations of the due process
and fairness rights of individuals under the Constitution and the European
Convention of Human Rightsl25-and to attempt to maintain a fair balance
between the State and the accused. Whether it hides its light under a bushel
or acts as a lodestar remains to be seen. One thing should, however, be clear.
If we allow the genie out of the due process bottle in the interests of public
protection, it will not find its way back in at some later date, even if it cannot
grant us our wish of greater security.
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